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ABSTRACT 
This chapter proposed a novel design methodology called Value-Sensitive  Design  
and its potential application to the field of artificial intelligence research and design. 
It discusses the imperatives in adopting a design philosophy that embeds values into 
the design of artificial agents at the early stages of AI development. Because of the 
high risk stakes in the unmitigated design of artificial agents, this chapter proposes 
that even though VSD may  turn out to be a less-than-optimal design methodology,  
it currently provides a framework that has the potential to embed stakeholder values 
and incorporate current design methods. The reader should begin to take away the 
importance of a proactive design approach to intelligent agents. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The field of artificial intelligence development is experiencing a productive period of in- 
credible progress and innovation, and any consequences, whether positive or otherwise,  
will fall on the designers’ shoulders. As such, the onus is on us to shape technological 
advancement in such a way as to mitigate any foreseeable and, as much as possible, 
unforeseeable catastrophic events. After several boom  and  bust  periods,  AI  is  now 
primed to be one of our most critical advancements as well as one of our most danger-    
ous ones. The impending emergence and proliferation of AI into the public sphere will 
assuredly  result  in  an  encompassing  revolution  of  sorts—one  that  will  affect  society 
and the ways in which both humans and nonhumans work and communicate, one that 
promises  to  change  our  quotidian  lives  by  relieving  us  of  menial  tasks,  and  one  that 
will fundamentally change how humans perceive ourselves, others, and the world – and  
vice versa. 
AI designers have already begun  in  earnest  to  develop  sophisticated  systems  that 
mimic, and in  certain  cases  surpass,  human  intelligence:  such  advancements  are  ca- 
pable of learning, interacting with their surroundings, and making novel  decisions, all      
in  autonomous  manners  and  when  faced  with  highly  variable  situations.  Because  of 
this level of intelligence, the agents do  and  will  possess—their  increasing  capacity  to 
receive information about their  environment,  decide,  and  act—the  obvious  question 
arises: Who is responsible if something goes wrong? But perhaps the question that 
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should be  asked  is,  how  can  technology  be  made  to  advance  such  that  it  is  encour- 
aged  to  grow  and  simultaneously  herded  to  progress  in  a  manner  that  doesn’t  lead 
to disaster? After all, responsibility is often an afterthought; it  typically  begins  after 
something has gone awry, when intentional guidance could have reduced or eliminated 
unwanted  consequences along with the clumsiness of deferring disaster to an individual    
or  homogenized entity. 
In their ability to reason and behave using human-like logic, these intelligent agents 
become actors in the real world where they may interact with human agents and even 
engage in activities they are given complete control over. Self-driving vehicles, military 
robotics, smart home devices, big data analysis software, and care robots are just a few 
examples of technologies that already use artificially intelligent processes, albeit many 
are currently rudimentary, to afford us the opportunity to rely on robotic devices to 
complete tasks for users that they can’t do on their own, or to afford the luxury of not 
having to engage in the completion of routine duties. 
Current trends in the development of intelligent agents illustrate not only the ex-   
tent to which existing systems are autonomous but also how increased autonomy will 
continue to decrease the amount of human supervision necessary to their normal func- 
tioning. This abdication of certain activities along with the human-like qualities AI will 
bring should make us feel a sense of responsibility; the progression of the technology 
should be a call to arms to ensure that due consideration is given to their development. 
This becomes truer as the range of abilities of intelligent agents widens. As the breadth 
of functional capacity grows, it becomes imperative that designers take steps to design 
systems that will not act dangerously or undermine stakeholder interests. Even if in- 
ternational command and control mechanisms and regulations are put into practice to 
ensure the safe and consistent behavior of agent, multi-agent, and human-agent level 
systems, ethical issues associated with their design and implementation are still likely to 
remain complex, with additional emerging issues sure to arise that will implicate a broad 
range of values, moral issues, and ethical principles. 
Of course, further complexities spawn from the implementation of ethical approaches 
taken when designing or constructing physical entities or AI. The choosing of ethical 
frameworks and the intricacies of value alignment become all the  more  pressing  as 
intelligent agents confront and are exposed to novel environments, grow in  human- 
nonhuman society, interact with other agents based on different design principles, act on 
behalf of people, and share common resources (Taylor et al. 2016; Soares and Fallenstein 
2014; see also van  den Hoven and Jacob 2013). 
To tackle these issues, this chapter proposes that a particularly suitable design ap- 
proach to combat these complexities while continuing to permit the steadfast nature     
of scientific development is one that allows involved parties to visualize and take into 
consideration important human values such as safety, privacy, accountability, and sus- 
tainability.  In addition to these considerations, the design approach must also—and   
this is what separates it from rigid value approaches or responsibility attribution meth- 
ods—beg for involved parties to prepare for moral conflicts as and before the AI devel- 
opment is underway. Moreover, the value-laden design method should be flexible in that 
it can swiftly adapt to value trade-offs and moral overload (Van den Hoven, Lokhorst, 
and Van de Poel 2012). For instance, when designing a self-driving vehicle, designers 
may choose to impart it with human-like driving behaviors instead of the behaviors   
one would anticipate—a vehicle with strict, precise measures to drive in a calculated 
manner based on road rules. Though initial planning stages may have designers agree 
that safety is of utmost importance, real-world experimentation may yield results that 
argue in favor of self-driving vehicles responding to and behaving as if a real human 
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driver were manning it. Accomplishing this may ultimately require balancing deontic rule-
following, utility maximization, and risk assessment in the agent’s logic to achieve   the 
ultimate goal of roadway safety. Thus flexibility and prevalence during design and 
execution  make  for  critical  parameters  of  a  design  methodology,  one  that  applies  to 
AI. 
Given these considerations, the design methodology that most suits what we  be-  
lieve to be an all-encompassing, flexible, and capable one is known as value-sensitive 
design (VSD). Though various design methodologies could be employed in order to 
safely design intelligent agents—participatory design, universal design, user-centered 
design, and inclusive design—the aim of this chapter is to introduce VSD as a potential 
and undeniable candidate for carefully and unrestrainedly approaching the design of 
beneficial intelligent agents. Although future research projects may show that another 
design approach or an amalgamation of existing methods may be more suitable, this 
chapter aims to show how contemporary design psychology and methodology may pro- 
vide the most appropriate starting framework, given the speed of development and the 
risks associated with unmitigated engineering (Baum 2016; Muehlhauser and Bostrom 
2014; Soares and Fallenstein 2014). 
 
2. An Introduction to Value-Sensitive Design 
 
Before applying the design theory and proving how it can be used to the benefit of 
ethical and responsible methods of producing intelligent agents, it is important to have 
an understanding of the theory itself, its main components, and its limitations. 
The most notable literature written on VSD has been produced by  Batya  Friedman,       
in which  she  comprehensively  breaks  down  the  design  methodology  to  both  illustrate 
what it is and how it can be applied to fields dealing with digital technologies, tech- 
nologies that affect humans physiologically and psychologically, and intricate prediction 
software that influence the future of our world. She sums up VSD as “a theoretically 
grounded approach to the design of technology that accounts for  human  values  in  a 
principled and comprehensive manner throughout the design process”  (Friedman,  Kahn  
Jr.,  and  Borning  2006,  1;  see  also  Friedman  1996;  Friedman  and  Kahn  2002).  Proba- 
bly the most notable aspect of this definition and one that was previously detailed is         
the fact that VSD is a design  methodology  that  does  not  take  place  during  any  one 
instance during  the design phases—it  occurs during all of  them. 
Prior to Friedman’s outlining of VSD and its applications, there have been scarce 
amounts of context given to such design methods, their theories, and implementations. 
She lays out a particularly useful set of methods, which she calls an integrative and it- 
erative tripartite methodology, for framing the three non-sequential activities essential 
to VSD: conceptual investigations, empirical investigations, and technical investiga- 
tions. It is important to note that these three investigations combine to form the cycle   
of duties involved in the appropriate application of VSD to the field of interest. 
The  theoretical  approach  of  VSD  and  its  tripartite  investigations  set  it  apart  from 
other design approaches because it is self-reflexive, fallible, and continually improving. 
Unlike the typical methods of ascribing responsibilities to certain parties or groups of 
people, which often only account for issues after they arise, VSD takes a more proactive 
approach. That is, its value-focus is not singular or temporally locked, but it seeks to  
predict emerging values and issues and in response “influences the design of technology 
early  in  and  throughout  the  design  process”  (Friedman,  Kahn  Jr.,  and  Borning  2006, 
12). Such approaches break down the fear caused by merit-based perspectives to re- 
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sponsibility and the potential scenarios of bribery found in ascribing responsibility in rights-
based perspectives (Doorn 2012). 
Merit-based  approaches,  as  Doorn  (2012)  argues,  take  a  retributivist  angle  on  how 
and who should be held liable. The person or people  involved  in  the  misdemeanor  or 
success of a technology,  sentient  or otherwise, ultimately receive the praise or the blame   
in merit-based approaches. This is a dangerous, narrow-minded method of delegating 
responsibility, and for two  reasons: (1) It instills fear in those creating new technologies    
to  explore  creative,  risky  opportunities  and  (2)  there  exists  categorical  differences  in 
the way in which responsibility can be broken down—moral responsibility vs. causal 
responsibility. It is the latter of the two  reasons, with its critical distinction, that will         
be discussed in further detail in below. 
Causal responsibility could be  anything  from  sheer  luck  to  some  negative  happen- 
stance  that  a  person  has  no  reasonable  control  over,   whereas  moral  responsibility  
has  more  to  do  with  those  involved  in  the  creation  process  of  a  particular  technol- 
ogy. Ascribing responsibility to either of the two, moral and causal responsibility, be-  
comes muddied when it comes to technologies—and especially, in this case, intelligent 
agents—with several variables and a vast array of  professionals  providing input  in  the 
creation process. When something goes wrong, should the blame fall both on the user     
and the creator? And if so, how  many of those parties involved  in the creation should      
be held liable? A merit-based approach, like a  rights-based  approach,  both  hinge  on 
methods focused on defining responsibility and blameworthiness. 
In  a  rights-based  approach,  the  focus  is  placed  on  the  rights  of  the  users,  those 
that  could  be  potential  victims  for  adverse  outcomes  caused  by  the  technology.  Like 
a  merit-based  approach,  this  perspective  pays  close  attention  to  ethical  complications 
after one has been transgressed. It aims to be remedial. Actions are imperative in the rights-
based approach, where how the  end  users  are  impacted  matter  greatly.  The two driving  
forces  behind  the  approach  are  strict  liability  (a  legal  requirement)  and informed 
consent. 
The first, strict liability, serves to identify which person was involved in the outcome 
that posed direct harm to a victim. Taking what has been explained about merit-based 
responsibility, it’s quite clear that ascribing accountability in this way becomes tricky 
when the person involved may have triggered it by accident. Nonetheless, the rights- 
based approach identifies all parties, the creators, and the users, as those who carry the 
responsibility of ensuring that no harm is done. This is where the second driving force, 
informed consent, enters the discussion. Informed consent is a method of safeguarding 
certain parties from taking responsibility for certain outcomes. It advocates for the  
clear, unrestrictive explanation of possible outcomes to potential users so that the    
users themselves can decide whether they are comfortable with the benefits and possible 
hazards that follow the implementation of technologies. 
Again, there are issues with this as well. While informed consent is a steady approach 
when it comes to forging a relationship between creators and users, as it calls for the 
comprehension and voluntary participation of users, it fails when it comes to making 
technological progress in a frictionless manner. To  clarify, the final say is up to the users   
to decide whether to proceed with the advancement and doing so ultimately means that      
if most of a collective group agree that the technology is too risky, it won’t be developed 
(Doorn 2012). While this certainly makes sense and is a sturdy safeguarding method to  
keep  irresponsible,  unethical  design  approaches  and  technologies  at  bay,  it  also  opens 
the issue of bribery. In a move to appease potential users, those developing the new, 
potentially uncertain  technologies  may  resort  to  providing  monetary  compensation  to 
those members of the user group who have vetoed the development. Of course, the 
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other issues it causes relate to the fact  that  many  users,  no  matter  how  imperative 
informed consent makes it, will not fully understand what the new technology entails   
today or in the years to come. 
These  responsibility  ascriptions  are  important  to  understand  because  they  high- 
light the issues involved when determining methods for protecting humans from unin- 
tended or unlucky consequences imposed by  new technologies. In an effort to elucidate   
the effectiveness of  VSD,  we  have  detailed  accounts  of  the  merit-based  and  rights- 
based approaches responsibility because  their  shortcomings,  though  having  some  de- 
sirable outcomes, are avoided by its tripartite methods. Whereas the responsibility 
ascriptions focus mainly on future outcomes  or  sometimes  hard  stops  in  the  initial 
phases, VSD works from  both  dimensions.  The  tripartite  method  that  will  be  dis- 
cussed in detail—conceptual investigations, empirical investigations, and technical in- 
vestigations—collaborate to account for consequences as they arise during and after 
development. 
Friedman explains several qualities about VSD that set  it  apart  from  other  design 
methods, and by extension, we argue that these distinct qualities also  contrast  VSD 
concerning the traps set  by  merit-based  and  rights-based  perspectives.  These  include 
classes like proactivity, diverse areas of application, widened scope of stakeholders (both 
direct stakeholders—such as designers, patients, and users—and indirect stakeholders,   
such as the general public and corporations), and careful attention to universally held   
values (Timmermans,  Zhao,  and  van  den  Hoven  2011).  There  are  more,  but  we  think 
these are the most critical when it comes to grasping the stark differences and benefits  
posed by  this design methodology. 
Beginning with proactivity, this quality is the impetus of which all the tripartite 
methodologies  are  based  on.  Without  proactive  measures,  advancements  are  met  with 
the necessity to take correctional measures after the fact, which of course involves  a merit-
based approach. VSD  avoids  these  issues  of  determining  the  difference  between moral 
responsibility and causal responsibility. When  it  comes  to  a  rights-based  ap- proach, 
though one could argue that it too behaves proactively,  the insecurity of such          a 
method is that it focusses too much  on a single aspect of the stakeholder and is more      of 
an actions-based method than one drawn from an  approach  that  is  theoretically grounded 
and that takes more than one party into consideration. 
The second differentiating quality deals with the extent to which VSD is more diverse 
than other design methods, and as we argue, the frameworks set by the two discussed 
responsibility attributions. Friedman explains, “. . . Value  Sensitive Design enlarges the 
arena in which values arise to include not only the work place, but also educations, the 
home, commerce, online communities, and public life”  (Friedman,  Kahn Jr., and Born-  
ing 2006, 13). It is critical that it extends to all these areas, especially when it comes          
to the engineering and operationalization of values in design because such technologies 
naturally involve several and most often overlapping areas of concerned members. This  
also encroaches on the differences seen from VSD’s widened scope of what it considers 
stakeholders. While other design approaches, which will not be discussed in detail here, 
employ either method of collaboration or democratic values, VSD tries to capture the   
needs of several  groups  comprehensively  and  doesn’t  exclude  certain  parties  just  be- 
cause their needs are not in the majority, like the Inclusive Design methodology (see   
Briggs and Thomas 2015; Clarkson et al. 2003; Keates and Clarkson 2003; Newell et        
al. 2011). 
Finally, VSD takes into account the importance of universally held values. This too is 
critical when dealing with AI technologies, as they will certainly be used across varying, 
diverse cultures and moral systems. Universally held values, as described by Friedman, 
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arise  when discussing  the seemingly  different values  held  by  various  cultures, but  that 
have similar core values (whether this is actually true is a worthwhile future research 
project). What one culture does to promote etiquette, another culture may  express 
differently. VSD aims to account for this  and  requires  that  the  development  of  tech- 
nologies  acknowledge  values  that  appear  different  but  that  are  nonetheless  universally 
held.  Although  the  philosophical  grounding  of  universal  values  is  highly  contentious 
in  the  philosophical  literature,  the  VSD  methodology  seeks  to  ground  its  ascription 
of universality on the common root  values  that  are  instantiated  differently  in  various 
cultures (Friedman  1996; Friedman  and Kahn Jr.   2002). 
Equipped with the knowledge of what VSD is and what it does differently to over-    
come the shortfalls of certain responsibility ascriptions, it is critical to understand how      
its  three  design  perspectives  each  add  to  the  combined,  all-encompassing  nature  of 
the approach. The three—conceptual, empirical, and technical— investigations lend 
themselves to the proactive nature of the design. That is, each of the three carries each  
other along, and when one area fails, it likely causes all other areas to require some     
taking care of as well. Each of the three cannot stand on its own, and all of them must      
be accounted for when taking a value-sensitive approach to design. 
 
2.1. Conceptual	Investigation	
The first of the three, conceptual, is the more theoretical aspect of VSD. In short, con- 
ceptual investigations are those that are informed by  philosophy.  This area of engage-   
ment involves answering  the  critical  questions  related  to  defining  certain  parameters 
before and during  technological  developments,  the  5  Ws:  Who  are  the  stakeholders? 
What  are  the  related  values  in  this  scenario?  Where  do  certain  parameters  begin  and 
end when discussing the bounds of  usability  versus  privacy/safety  and  direct  versus 
indirect stakeholder? When  are  the  agreed  upon  methods  and  procedures  no  longer 
viable or in support of the values  being sought? Why  is one design supported and an-   
other excluded? These questions and other theoretical areas are explored in conceptual 
investigations (see Denning, Kohno, and Levy 2013 for a good example of the  VSD 
application to computer security and smart homes. This is particularly  illustrative  of 
intellegent systems). 
Part of Friedman’s exploration of conceptual investigations include a real-world ap- 
plication for cookies used in web browsers. In her discussions, she evaluates the impor- 
tance of informed consent in such technologies so that users know what cookies are and 
what their function is, so that such members have  full control over  whether they accept   
the use of such tracking software. Though we have mentioned the dangers of informed 
consent when drawing on literature related to responsibility, this example provides the 
opportunity  to  further  bolster  the  effectiveness  of  the  tripartite  methodology  adopted 
by VSD. Because there are  inherent  shortcomings  to  permission  architectures  like  in- 
formed consent, such as bribery or crippling fear, not only does VSD compensate by 
including  other  investigations,  but  informed  consent  on  its  own  is  certainly  not  the 
only discussion part of the conceptual third. Conceptual methods involve research, the 
background knowledge that other investigations will  draw  from,  and  while  informed 
consent on its own  may lead to hard stops or unfair blame, it combines with the re- 
mainder of the perspectives to correct and assess advancements from multiple areas of  
need. 
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2.2. Empirical	 Investigation	
The second of the three investigations is empirical. As the name suggests, an empirical 
investigation involves taking account of quantifiable measures relating to the potential 
success or failure of a particular development. The variables quantified could be things like 
statistical  data  that  describes  patterns  of  human  behavior,  assessments  that  mea-  sure 
the  needs  and  wants  of  the  users,  and  the  dichotomy  between  what  people  say they 
want in a design and what they actually care about in practice (Friedman, Kahn Jr., and 
Borning 2006). An example of such an instance where users contend with not truly  
knowing what their expectations for a new technology are, can be illustrated by those     
who ask for privacy by having a prompt give them control over whether to allow cookies   
to be used in web  browsers. When this prompt runs, some users may  take  the time to   read 
it and make a conscious decision, while others may, in an effort to browse without 
disruption, skip past or ignore the message. Whereas conceptual investigations are  more 
like background evidence and qualitative support for a technological  design endeavor, 
empirical methods extend the research to precise  measurements  to  prove, resolve, or 
progress design work. Of course, investigating the potential impact imposed by  
technologies through quantitative and qualitative means  falls  short  if  the  materials 
themselves, that is, the technical nature of the devices isn’t explored. 
 
2.3. Technical	 Investigations	
The final investigation is  technical.  Technical  investigations  involve  considering  the 
actual materials and the nature of the technology. For example, when developing intel-  
ligent agents, one would want  to consider the delivery method: should the technology      
be embodied within a shell like  a  robot?  Should  it  simply  be code  delivered  to  com- 
puting systems? Should it exist  within  several  household  items  like  other  Internet  of 
Things (IoT) devices? The  technical  questions  become  important  in  the  operational- 
ization of values given that they can constrain how those values are instantiated in the 
design. 
All of  these  kinds  of  questions  form  the  basis  of  technical  investigations  because 
they ask about the nature of the technology  and  their  abilities  to  support  values.  As 
Friedman says “. . . a given technology is more suitable for certain activities and more 
readily supports certain values  while rendering other activities and values  more difficult   
to realize”  (Friedman,  Kahn Jr., and Borning  2006). 
 
3. Applying VSD to Intelligent Agents Using the Tripartite Methodology 
 
3.1. Conceptual		Investigations		and		the		Moral	Dilemma	
Perhaps the most difficult question we need to answer when it comes to researching, 
creating,  and  implementing  intelligent  agents  is  related  to  what  it  means  to  be  moral 
and how  morality differs or parallels ethics. What does it mean to be moral? Is being   
moral the same as being ethical? And, of concern here, is morality and ethics the same     
for  intelligent  agents—is  our  anthropic  approach  to  morality  ethical  or  fair  to  endow 
on intelligent agents? Should they have  their  own  class  of  what  is  right  and  what  is 
wrong? 
Keith Abney (2014) defines this problem well when he explains that when developing 
autonomous robotics—and it’s similar for intelligent agents in general—there are three  
ways to define ethics: (1) the ethical practices of the human creators, users, owners, 
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customers; (2) the principles that are endowed to the robot; and (3) the transcendence         
of  the  robot  to  think  for  itself  and  therefore  follow  its  own  ethical  framework.  And 
to take his definition of morals versus  ethics,  morals  are  actions  that  "ought"  to  be 
followed or avoided, and ethics are the rules for and the study of moral beliefs. Con- 
ceptual investigations involve researching and understanding specific scenarios where 
technologies are to be used, and for as long as intelligent agents are not quite as ad-   
vanced to make conscious decisions as a human would (i.e., a “deliberative system”), 
designers must consider that circumstance is an important consideration when making         
a choice to embed intelligent agents with moral programming. 
Though the tripartite methodology can’t answer the question of how to create the 
perfect, here meaning moral, intelligent agent, it can aid in the development of the 
best possible, most comprehensive technological progress that behaves in a perceptibly 
ethical manner. Using the conceptual investigative component of VSD, research can be 
done to assess the stakeholders involved and their expectations of morality. Following 
conceptual investigations, aside from the correctional process of accounting for the 
other two areas of the tripartite combination, serves to lead engineers and ethicists 
away from following strictly their own beliefs of morality and instead inject morals 
that, at least on a base level, are universal (i.e., stakeholder sensitive), followed by 
ethical frameworks that embody the notions of morality within the specific area of use. It  
is this approach to design, which includes what Friedman calls values that are 
"universally held," that set it apart from other design methods (Friedman, Kahn Jr., and 
Borning 2006, 2). Conceptual design is but one of the facets of VSD, but it sets the stage 
for what is to follow by beginning with a concrete stance on what are deemed to be 
universally held values, which are then extended by methods to cater to circumstantial 
events. 
 
3.2. The		Need		to		Break		Down		Human	 Language	
Though it is critical to construct a moral framework for intelligent agents when involved    
in the conceptual investigations, focusing solely on universally held values may, in fact,  
take away from the strengths of VSD’s deviation from rights-based approaches to 
responsibility.  It  is  certainly  critical  to  provide  a  rigid  framework  of  dos  and  don’ts 
for intelligent agents, much like those given to  young  children,  but  restricting  such 
creations to a finite set of conditionals creates a complicated mess of logic and breeds 
accusatory actions when something goes wrong (Soares 2016). 
Though counteridenticals,  as  Bringsjord  (2016)  describes  them,  can  provide  a  thor- 
ough understanding of intelligent agents through a series of grammatical frame- works—
conditional sentences with subordinate clauses—the complexity of such con- structions 
increase with things like the involved verb mood. These  can  be  used  in intelligent agents 
so that they do what they ought to do, refrain from doing what they   aren’t supposed to do, 
and sometimes do what is beyond expectation. While this sets         up  a  critical  
construction  for  the  creation  of  intelligent  agents,  it  is  also  crucial  that the design 
phases consider the import of circumstances that aren’t so well defined. 
By relying merely on shallow or deep approaches like counteridenticals or counterfac- 
tuals, parties involved in creating the code to form the base of the agent’s decisions will 
surely miss some areas of uncertainty.  Therefore, alone, counteridenticals are likely not     
to account for a vast range of scenarios like VSD approaches can. VSD, as will be dis- 
cussed, plugs the holes left by qualitative research done in the conceptual investigation  
with  empirical investigations. 
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3.3. A	Controlled	Approach	
VSD’s strength is not found in one individual method, but in the combination and the 
recursive  nature  of  the  three  design  investigations.  Thus,  it  makes  sense  to  introduce 
and  add  other  methods  of  answering  questions  regarding  morality.   Perhaps  looking  
to autonomous vehicles (AVs) is helpful when deciding on and providing for ethically  
sound  intelligent agents. 
Dogan et al. (2016) explain the importance of closing moral decision making so that 
decisions are made based on a limited amount  of  data.  If  designers  consider  human 
morality  the  goal  when  creating  intelligent  agents,  then  we  would  argue  that  people 
only deal with a limited amount of information at once when making decisions. There is 
also the fact that humans do make decisions rooted in emotion. Disregarding emotion,        
it is fair to say that creators of intelligent agents would  likely  want  emotion,  again 
depending on the circumstance, to be left out, although design frameworks like the 
independent core observer model (ICOM) may ultimately  prove  more  beneficial  in the 
long run  (Waser  2016).  This  is  where  adding  to  the  counteridentical  framework 
described above becomes critical: there are too many variables to account for and too   
many ways  of  solving  or  behaving  during  a  situation  that  limiting  certain  decisions 
seem to  be  the  only  way,  particularly  to  mitigate  any  adverse  outcomes  that  may 
result from a top-down hierarchical goal structure (Taylor  et al. 2016b). That is unless     
the  intelligent  agent  has  transcended  traditional  artificial  intelligence  (Goertzel  2016; 
Rolf and Crook 2016). 
Using VSD’s conceptual approach, we can also account for what Dogan et al. (2016) 
define as the two  clusters  of  values:  self-transcendence  and  self-enhancement.  He  ex- 
plains that in the creation of AVs, and this  can  arguably  be  extended  for  any  au- 
tonomous type of technology, these two values  are  the  driving  force  behind  their  be- 
haveior.  The  first  values  the  collective,  so  designers  would  endow  intelligent  agents 
with the goal of offering protection for the greater good, while the second cluster of    
values involves accounting for individual interests. Again, depending on the context, as 
studied in conceptual investigations, it is important to consider the  technology  being 
developed to decide  if  the  collective  or  the  individual  is  of  moral  import.  The  flexi- 
bility offered by VSD allows for such considerations to balance the variables: positive, 
negative, good, bad, better, worse, moral, and immoral. 
AVs  often employ the use of principle-based approaches to their functionalities. That    
is, they behave according to rigid principles, usually traffic laws. However, case-based 
approaches are important as well since cases will often be circumstantial when dealing   
with such technologies like automated vehicles. Once again, the  strength  of  a  VSD 
approach  has  the  potential  to  accommodate  for  all  these  aspects  and  could  in  fact  
be used, as we suggest, to intermingle both approaches as explained above. Perhaps a 
mixture of hard and fast laws, as those found in traffic laws, and case-based approaches     
to governing certain behaviours are critical when creating specific technological devices, 
and therefore for intelligent agents (see Bonnemains, Saurel, and Tessier 2016; Laurent 
Orseau and Armstrong 2016; Mermet and  Simon  2016). 
 
3.4. Empirical		Investigations		and		the		Moral		Dilemma	
Friedman outlines empirical investigations as any “activity that can be observed, mea-  
sured, or documented” (Friedman, Kahn Jr., and Borning 2006, 4). As conceptual 
investigations  investigate  more  of  the  background  information  regarding  the  viability 
of an intelligent agent, empirical investigations gain their importance from taking a 
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closer look at exactly how  users and other stakeholder make use of the technology in     
their daily lives, the consequences of such purposes, the potential drawbacks of certain 
features,  and  other  opportunity  costs.  Because  users  frequently  ask  for  features  that 
they don’t actually use, empirical investigations help to balance what is included and     
what is excluded from final prototypes in order to mitigate dangers or promote better      
user experience. 
Given the complexity and sophistication of intelligent agents it is necessary to define 
how  empirical  investigations  are  to  be  used.  If  we  consider  intelligent  agents  as  hav- 
ing similar rights and responsibilities as humans, which can be argued using Abney’s 
explanations of what constitutes personhood as an example (see Abney 2014), then it     
may  not make sense to empiricize every behavior of the intelligent agent as if it was  a   
tool to be used for some task. 
The very ability of VSD to accommodate for and remain plastic in several scenarios 
lends itself well to such a case. Designers can apply empirics in some way when designing 
an intelligent agent, though it may be different than for other  technologies.  Friedman 
exemplifies this by explicitly outlining empirical investigations as they are used for 
technologies such as web browser cookies, television-screen windows,  and  urban  sim 
software  (Friedman,  Kahn  Jr.,  and  Borning  2006).  As  such,  it  is  important  to  note 
that VSD is applicable to various technologies, and can be applied to intelligent agents      
as well. 
Take for example intelligent agents that serve multiple  purposes,  designers  could 
measure how  users, perhaps in a psychological sense, interact with the agents. Do hu-   
mans accept them as moral beings or disregard them as artificially intelligent software 
shelled by chunks of metal and plastic? Of course, such research also combines with the 
technical investigations we will  examine  shortly,  because  the  form  and  look  of  the 
intelligent agent is perhaps as important as what its functions are (see Breazeal 2003; 
Bourke and Duffy 2003; Fussell  et al. 2008; Tao  et al. 2008). 
In another scenario, designers may perform empirical investigations by measuring the  
other  critical  data  such  as  the  measurable  benefits  the  intelligent  agents  provide    to 
the domain they  work  in,  the  increase  in  quality  of  life  of  those  who  employ  the 
systems, and the consistency of ethical or non-ethical behaviours as set out during the 
conceptual investigations.  Empirics  are  critical  because  they  essentially  back  up  the 
more  quantitative  evidence  and  research  performed  in  the  conceptual  investigations. 
The empirical evidence  is to  take  that  background  research  and present a  case  for the 
usage of the technology, in this case the intelligent agents, in real-world situations. 
 
3.5. Calculating	Good	
One  of the  more important  considerations  when creating  ethical  frameworks  for robots 
is that  there  is  great  difficulty  in  calculating  actions,  or  inactions,  as  being  moral. 
That, plus it is “. . . an impossible demand to calculate the utility of every alternative   
course of action” (Abney 2014). Not only do intelligent agents face the aforementioned 
frame problem of first-order logic when facing weighty decisions, but so does behavior 
frameworks  such  as  cost-benefit  analyses  as  solutions  to  utilitarianism  (see  also  Lau- 
rent Orseau and Armstrong 2016; Soares and Levinstein 2017; Soares, Yudkowsky, and 
Armstrong 2015; Sotala 2016; Taylor  et al. 2016). Such reductive methods of quantify-   
ing and assigning values to things like love, devotion, and honor, is scarcely a suitable 
method as is the embedding of a moral framework that ignores these important human 
values (see Stocker 1976; Wolf 1982). 
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As with  counteridenticals,  the  installation  of  intelligent  agents  cannot  be supported 
using just empirical methods to uphold their value and validate their reasons for being 
created. As mentioned in the conceptual investigations  portion  of  this  chapter,  such 
methods are perhaps critical in setting up a basic framework, but like VSD, other areas      
of research and experimentation is required to comprehend the limits of individual 
approaches entirely. Quantifying good for example is  almost  impossible  because  one 
person’s good may not necessarily fit with another’s—also what is considered good for    
an intelligent agent may  not necessarily be considered good for a human (Allen 1997;  
Stahl 2004; Wiltshire 2015). Again, it all depends  on the approaches  taken, as guided      
by conceptual investigations, and what the outcome is to achieve. 
Nonetheless, one of the most complex aspects of designing intelligent agents is that 
everyone  wants  them  to  be,  first  and  foremost,  moral  beings,  yet  human  agents  are 
far from moral when it comes to the consistency of their behaviours (Dodig Crnkovic      
and Çürüklü 2012; Hellström 2013; Johnson and Axinn 2013; Nadeau 2006; Torrance 
2013; Scheutz and Malle 2014; Sotala 2016). Abney (2014) details the oft-discussed two 
features of being considered moral persons: an inner moral sense and an emotional inner 
life. That is, humans make decisions  based  on  emotion  and  deliberative,  reasonable 
thought processes. While the emotional decisions are not considered a necessity when        
it comes to making  moral  decisions,  it  is  an  important  component  because  it  often 
clouds our decision making and is something to take into  account  when  empirically 
analyzing  how  humans  and  nonhumans  interface  with  intelligent  agents,  and  perhaps 
how they reciprocate actions without having emotionally grounded social behaviours. 
 
3.6. Technical		Investigations		and		Real-World	Application	
Of  course,  any  intelligence-based  technology  would  be useless  if  it  could  not  interact 
with  its  users,  including  other  intelligence-based  technology,  in  an  expected,  precise, 
and ethical manner (Muehlhauser  and  Helm  2012;  Laurent,  Orseau  and  Armstrong 
2016a; Soares, Yudkowsky, and Armstrong 2015b). Technical investigations are a mar-  
riage of conceptual and empirical investigations in that that they take  what was  learned  
and combine them to impart on a physical system all the important information gath-     
ered.  The  tripartite  approach,  however,  doesn’t  limit  technical  investigations  to  occur 
in isolation. Often, changing the form factor  of  technology,  especially  considering  in- 
telligent agents can be housed in a variety of embodiments, may  influence  further 
conceptual or empirical investigations. 
Further,  there may be occasions where those additional investigations affect changes  
that are imperative to make to the technical aspects of the intelligent agent. Take the 
production of an intelligent agent in the form of a care robot that is to assist an elderly 
person with daily tasks—if at first designers believe that an assistant must ask users for 
permission to assist them with every micro task, they may soon learn that such requests 
impede  the  actual  aid  of  the  system  and  end  up  doing  more  to  frustrate  users  than 
help them (van Wynsberghe 2013). Situations like this would call for further empirical 
investigations to tabulate the behaviour of both the care robots and the elderly people   
using it.  Also,  the  situation  may  call  for  further  conceptual  investigations  to  gather 
more information about what the resultant technology is to do and should do. 
Once again, we arrive at the fact that VSD can be of great service to producing intel- 
ligent agents—discussing technical investigations—given that intelligent agents include a 
broad scope of technologies to be used in various fields. Having the flexibility on offer 
means that changes can be made, even far into development cycles to ensure that all 
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three areas of the  methodology  are  applied  appropriately  and  consistently.  The  other 
benefit  is  that  all  three  investigations,  as  detailed  with  the  care  robot  example,  feed 
into one another in  fluid,  well-connected  manners;  they  are  not  separated  by  distinct 
design phases. 
 
3.7. Avoiding		After-The-Fact		Dilemmas	
Because intelligent agents can be used in diverse fields for a wide variety of cutting- 
edge technologies, there is a lot that can go wrong. Something unexpected can break,   
a feature can become outdated without a modulatory structure in place to modify          
it without a complete overhaul, something can function unintentionally, and worst of  
all, something terribly unsafe can occur. With all of these worries, there needs to be 
something to mitigate them, and that’s where technical investigations help to prevent 
such mishaps. 
As applies to all of VSD, it is not a perfect approach that can solve any  engineer-        
ing issue or account for every possible future consequence,  but  it  can  surely  help  to 
minimize  the  effects  of  several  issues  before  they  arise;  it’s  much  better  than  using 
an isolated ethical framework and resorting to ex-post facto remediation. Technical 
investigations provide the opportunity for the engineers and ethicists to experience the 
outcome of the conceptual and empirical studies—they can embody everything learned  
into an intelligent agent and then conduct further experiments and tests to see how the  
actual creation behaves within safe, controlled environments that replicate  real-world 
scenarios. 
And  if  something  were  to  go  awry,  it  can  be  modified,  adjusted,  accounted  for, 
and accommodated in future iterations. The value of VSD really comes together with 
technical investigations because it pulls together important quantitative and qualitative 
data—it is the outcome of formal investigations, not a haphazard  ad  hoc  attempt  at 
alignment. 
 
4. Harmonizing VSD 
 
VSD  begins  from  the  central  premise  that  technology  is  not  value-neutral,  meaning 
that technology is laden with  values  that  are  of  ethical  importance  to  individuals  and 
society (Flanagan, C. Howe, and Nissenbaum 2008). Such  moral  values  can  include 
freedom, equality, trust, autonomy, or privacy,  and  each  of  these  values  affects  and  is 
affected  by  the  technologies  that  embody  them  (Friedman  1997;  Friedman  and  Kahn 
Jr. 2002). Other design methodologies tend to focus on the functionality and usability        
of  innovations,  whereas  the  VSD  approach  emphasizes  the  values  that  stakeholders 
(i.e.,  users,  designers,  corporate  entities,  etc.)  hold  to  be  important.  In  particular,  
VSD provides a grounded methodology that designers can levy when confronted with 
various and conflicting  values  (see  Friedman  and  Kahn  2002).  Because  value-related 
issues are connected to the application of technology within a social context, VSD aims     
to incorporate those value solutions  into  the  design  and  address  any  issues  that  may 
emerge during the early design phases before ubiquitous rollout. 
Although  numerous  other  design  methodologies  can  be  employed,  as  mentioned  in 
the  introduction  to  this  chapter,  the  VSD  approach  does  not  seek  to  provide  design- 
ers with an all-encompassing and exhaustive design  methodology  (Cummings  2006). 
Instead,  VSD  should  be  contextualized  as  a  method  that  is  meant  to  be  harmonized 
with current practices in whichever field it is sought to be employed. Since the VSD 
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approach is similar to existent engineering approaches used by  designers, the adoption      
of the VSD methodology in current research and development (R&D) practices makes        
it  an  attractive  means  by  which  to  operationalize  values  in  design  (Cummings  2006). 
The harmonization of the VSD methodology to current practices requires  a  thorough 
knowledge  of  practices  in  the  R&D  of  intelligent  agents.  By  garnering  a  knowledge 
of current practice  gaps,  the  shortcoming  of  existent  methods  can  be  uncovered  after 
which VSD can employ its conceptual and empirical investigations to meet the needs         
of  current practices. 
The values of safety, efficacy, and proportionality serve as good point of departure. 
These values express the constructive benefits that responsibly designed intelligent 
agents can provide to society as well as begin to address many of the safety and social 
issues raised in scholarship regarding the development of unmitigated intelligent agents 
(Armstrong, Bostrom, and Shulman 2016; Baum 2016; Dodig Crnkovic and Çürüklü 
2012). 
An example of the issues emerging from the development of intelligent agents that 
patterns a clear instance of the design-for-values approach is the design and develop-     
ment of care robots. Throughout  the  design  process  value  trade-offs  must  be weighed 
against the  value  of  capability,  efficiency,  and  safety  (van  Wynsberghe  2013).  Capa- 
bility would entail that the care robot is capable of providing a high standard of care          
by  possessing  qualities  like  strength,  articulation,  and  intelligence  in  order  to  cater 
care to the need of the individual patient. Safety, on  the other  hand, would mean  not 
causing harm to the patient either physically or through malfeasance.  In  trying  to 
determine the moral weight  solicited  during  these  trade-offs,  a  means  by  which  these 
values can be morally grounded is required. The VSD approach provides a transparent 
methodology through which designers can investigate the values of stakeholders,  con- 
ceptualize any existent or emerging issues by drawing from the philosophical literature,   
and operationalize those values  during  the design  phases. 
Finally, the adoption of the VSD methodology can be enhanced by aligning existing 
testing  practices  with  those  proposed  by  the  empirical  investigation  methods.  Given 
the  lack  of  universal  regulations  on  intelligent  agents,  the  tolerances  and  testing  that 
they have to meet in order to be rolled out, as well as the lack of any agreed upon value- 
design landscape, a moral imperative to design intelligent agents with values  becomes      
of the utmost importance. Intelligent agents as both an emerging and converging tech- 
nology will almost certainly entail the emergence of new ethical and societal issues, as   
well as the exacerbation of current issues associated with its development. Integrating    
VSD with current practices could prove  beneficial if the resulting amalgamation broad-  
ens existent practices. Firstly, the values that emerge as a result of the convergence 
characteristic of intelligent agents with other technologies now have a methodological 
framework in which they can be sufficiently evaluated for design. Secondly, the strict 
methodology would serve to address better critical issues associated not only with the 
technology itself, but with the activities of designers and developers, for instance  by 
introducing potential surveillance techniques of AI designers in order to  reduce  the 
likelihood of rogue design (see Baum 2016). 
Sufficiently applying the VSD methodology to the development of intelligent agents 
requires complex and highly specific  insights  on  current  design,  developmental,  and 
testing practices from all over the globe. Hence, experts from the field of AI and robotics 
research  and  development  must  be  levied  as  integral  parts  of  VSD’s  implementation 
for it to be tailored to the specific area of intelligent agent R&D. The last two  decades      
of literature on the various potential applications of VSD serve as an excellent starting  
point for researchers and designers to draw from. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The introduction of intelligent systems and agents into the public  domain  poses  new 
challenges for all societal sectors. New technological synergies that are powered  by 
intelligent agents will experience the exacerbation of existent ethical issues while addi- 
tionally giving rise to new ones. Likewise, this changing ethical landscape will affect the 
ways in which we tackle these new problems. In this chapter, we explored how Value- 
Sensitive Design (VSD) can provide a way in  which  designers  can  close  the  chasm 
between technological design and ethics both before and during the  development  of 
intelligent agents before they become  ubiquitous. 
The  introduction  of  intelligent  agents,  embodied  as  autonomous  physical  entities  
or  otherwise,  will  undoubtedly  promote  a  level  of  ethical  and  social  complexity  that 
is common with other emerging and converging technologies  such  as  nanotechnology 
(Drexler 1981, 2006; Phoenix and Drexler 2004), biotechnology (Diallo et al. 2012; 
MacGregor 2013; Tait and Levidow 1992)  and ICT (Timmermans,  Zhao, and  van  den 
Hoven  2011). Likewise, by  framing intelligent agents as such, the inherent uncertainty   
and complexity can be employed as a sufficient starting  point  for  design.  The  VSD 
approach provides a pragmatic framework suited towards  the addressing of both exis-     
tent and  emerging  ethical  and  social  issues  during  all  phases  of  technological  design. 
VSD encourages and mandates the ethical evaluation of values, how  those  values  are 
embodied in design, as well as how those integrated values actually play  out  in  the 
application of developed innovations. 
Although  VSD  has  yet  to  be  applied  or  precisely  modulated  for  use  in  the  design 
of  intelligent  agents,  scholarship  has  begun  to  see  the  value  in  VSD  and  its  poten- 
tial applications to future  technologies  such  as  care  robots  (applies  to  Wynsberghe 
2013), ICT (Friedman,  Kahn  Jr.,  and  Borning  2006),  and  nanotechnology  (Timmer- 
mans, Zhao, and van den Hoven 2011). Regardless, this chapter has provided a rough 
exploration of how VSD  could  be  employed,  and  through  such  endeavours,  has  re- 
sulted  in  some  preliminary  results.  First,  it  shows  how  most  issues  that  are  critical 
to  design  and  important  to  stakeholders  can  be  reduced  to  operational  values  as  well 
as how stakeholders can come to be involved in the responsible  design of innovations. 
Second, VSD can and should be integrated and take into account the  existent  design 
approaches employed  by  engineers  and  designers  of  intelligent  agents.  By  bearing  in 
mind and combining homogenously with current engineering and design practices, the 
adoption of the VSD methodology and all of its resulting boons will not only be easier     
but a more attractive option when it comes to designing with values. 
The analyses  and  rudimentary  approach  of  VSD  outlined  in  this  chapter  are  far 
from conclusive or exhaustive; further research and testing need  to  be  undertaken  to 
determine the long-term suitability of the VSD methodology to the design of intelligent 
agents. From  an  ethical  standpoint,  further  conceptual  research  that  investigates  the 
issues and values implicated by intelligent agents is necessary,  but  more  importantly, 
regarding the empirical and technical investigations, further research must be engaged   
with on how  VSD  can  be  harmonized  into  the  concurrent  and  developing  intelligent 
agent  R&D practices. 
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